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1 Goodman (2002) has perceptively drawn attention to some ways in which Wittgenstein’s
thought can be regarded as ‘pragmatist.’ Using James’s Pragmatism as his main point of
reference,  he  identifies  a  number  of  pragmatist  themes  in  Wittgenstein’s  (1969)  On
Certainty, among which we also find Wittgenstein’s (1969: § 422) direct statement, “I am
trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism.” Notably, Goodman (2002: 21-3)
identifies  the  Wittgensteinian  notion  of  hinge  propositions  as  being  among  these
pragmatist themes.1 In the first part of this paper, I want to set out briefly the conception
of hinge propositions as articulated in On Certainty and then draw on Pritchard’s (2011,
2012) recent reading of their nature and significance to articulate the Wittgensteinian
concept of certainty implied by that reading.
2 Wittgenstein  develops  the  notion  of  hinge  propositions  from  the  observation  that,
whenever we doubt something, there must always be something which is not doubted,
taken for granted, as the background against which the doubt arises. If we have a doubt
about whether something is  the case,  we may engage in the practice of  checking or
testing the object of the doubt. As Wittgenstein (1969: § 163) illustrates the way in which
this checking process works:
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We check the story of Napoleon, but not whether all  the reports about him are
based on sense-deception, forgery and the like. For whenever we test anything, we
are already presupposing something that is not tested.
3 Later on, he makes the same point by pointing out that when I conduct an experiment to
test the truth of some proposition of which I am doubtful, I do not doubt the existence of
the apparatus before my eyes (Wittgenstein 1969: §§ 163, 337). The practice of testing
certain propositions, the truth of which is not beyond doubt, presupposes that the truth
of certain propositions is  beyond doubt:  that the documents about Napoleon are not
forged, that the apparatus really exists and so on. Wittgenstein (1969: § 88) contrasts such
propositions with “the route travelled by inquiry”; the route of inquiry is so structured as
to exempt certain propositions from doubt. If they are ever even explicitly formulated,
such propositions ‘lie apart’ from the route of inquiry; they are “the places inquiry does
not  go”  (Wittgenstein  1969:  § 88;  Goodman  2002:  21).  Such  propositions  are,  for
Wittgenstein  (1969:  §§ 342,  613)  “in  deed not  doubted,”  since  a  doubt  about  such
propositions, off the route of inquiry, would have the unwelcome consequence of “drag
[ging] everything with it and plung[ing] it into chaos.” Finally, Wittgenstein (1969: §§ 475,
359)  describes  our  commitment  to  such  propositions  as  “primitive”  and  “something
animal.” Unlike our commitment to propositions on the route of inquiry, the truth of
which is believed on the basis of our commitment to these indubitable propositions, our
commitment to a proposition of this latter kind does not reflect a belief but rather “a way
of acting” (Wittgenstein 1969: § 110). 
4 Propositions of this kind are known as ‘hinge propositions’ after a metaphor Wittgenstein
uses to illustrate their nature. Wittgenstein (1969: § 341) writes,
the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions
are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
5 As he goes on to explain a little later, “[w]e just can’t investigate everything and for that
reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the
hinges must stay put” (Wittgenstein 1969: § 343).
6 It seems intuitively clear that hinge propositions are subject to an attitude of certainty
and, indeed, there is plenty of evidence in Wittgenstein’s text to support this view. But
Pritchard’s work makes clear that the certainty with which we are typically committed to
hinge propositions is quite different from the certainty at which traditional epistemology
aims, the special kind of knowledge sought by Descartes and his successors.
7 Pritchard (2012) provides an argument to support the idea that it is just the certainty
with which we are committed to hinge propositions that is the obstacle to viewing those
commitments as matters of belief or knowledge. As he points out, for something to be a
ground for doubt, it has to be more certain than the target proposition which one is
calling into doubt.  If  it  were not more certain than the target proposition,  Pritchard
suggests,  one would have a  better  basis  for  rejecting the ground for  doubt  than for
rejecting the belief which is the target of the doubt itself. As he observes, this connects
with Wittgenstein’s (1969: § 125) question, “What is to be tested by what?” Let us take the
proposition,  in  normal  circumstances,  that  one  has  two  hands  as  an  example  of  a
proposition of which we are as certain as we are of any proposition. A doubt about the
proposition that I  have two hands would “drag everything with it and plunge it into
chaos” for, in that case, it would not make sense to check my belief that I have two hands
by looking for them, “[f]or why shouldn’t I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I
see my two hands?” (Wittgenstein 1969: § 125). It follows that I must be more certain of
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some other proposition (one functioning as a hinge proposition) than one that I call into
doubt. Wittgenstein seems to want to treat the proposition that I have two hands, in
normal circumstances, as just such a hinge proposition. Pritchard draws the conclusion
that hinge propositions are “logically immune to a rationally irresistible doubt since by
definition any ground for doubt in these propositions would be itself more dubitable than
the target proposition itself” (Pritchard 2012: 256). There can therefore be no rational
requirement to doubt a hinge proposition. Pritchard observes that this point about doubt
applies, in equal measure, to its counterpart, belief. He writes, 
just as grounds for doubt need to be more certain than the target belief that is
doubted, so grounds for belief need to be more certain than the target proposition
which is  believed otherwise they can’t  be coherently  thought to be playing the
required supporting role. A direct consequence of this point is that just as there can
be no rational  requirement  to  doubt that  which one is  most  certain  of,  so  one
cannot rationally believe it either. (Pritchard 2012: 257)
8 Contra G. E. Moore, then, the certainty with which one is committed to the proposition,
for  example,  that  one  has two  hands  is  not  an  indication  that  one  believes  or  has
knowledge  of  that  proposition.  As  Pritchard  argues  elsewhere,  this  certainty  is,  for
Wittgenstein, just what prevents the Moorean claim that one knows (or, a leviori, believes)
these propositions:
Wittgenstein’s claim is that whatever would count as a reason in favour of a claim
to  know  must  be  more  certain  than  the  proposition  claimed  as  known,  since
otherwise it would not be able to play this supporting role. But if the proposition
claimed as known is something which one is most certain of, then it follows that
there can be no more certain proposition which could be offered in its favour and
stand as the required supporting reason. (2011: 525, cf. Wittgenstein 1969: § 243)
9 Pritchard examines, and finds wanting, various recent readings of Wittgenstein which
attempt to defend the possibility of belief in, or knowledge of, hinge propositions. He puts
forward the alternative suggestion that hinge commitments do not put us in the market
for knowledge, are not beliefs (which could be acquired by the process of competent
deduction, for example) and, while they may be treated as propositional attitudes, they
cannot be treated as the specific propositional attitude of belief. While he admits that
agents can recognise the logical relationships between non-hinge propositions and hinge
propositions, Pritchard disputes that recognition of those relationships can be “part of a
process  through  which  one  acquires  belief,  and  thus  rational  belief,  in  these  hinge
propositions” (Pritchard 2012: 270). It follows that it is in the very nature of rational
support  that  it  is  essentially  local,  a  fact  which Pritchard thinks is  disguised by our
ordinary epistemic practices in which doubts about hinge propositions do not, as a matter
of fact, typically arise. The conclusion of Pritchard’s argument is that the propositions of
which we are most certain are not, even potentially, rationally supported but are rather
the  ‘hinges’  “relative  to  which  we  rationally  evaluate  –  and  thus  ‘test’  –  other
propositions” (Pritchard 2012: 257). The essentially local nature of rational support and
the consequent rational groundlessness of our hinge commitments2 implied by this non-
epistemic reading is what Pritchard takes Wittgenstein (1969: § 166) to be referring to
when he writes of the ‘groundlessness of our believing.’
10 Pritchard draws from Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge’ metaphor for these certainties the thought
that the rational groundlessness which they imply is not an optional or accidental feature
of our epistemic practices but is, rather, “essential to any belief-system.”3 But, in my view,
the  hinge  metaphor  also  indicates  an  altogether  more  pragmatist  import  of  this
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Wittgensteinian line of thought, captured by Wittgenstein’s (1969: § 343) phrase “If I want
the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.”4 In my view, this phrase, “If I want the door to
turn…,” implies the relativity of our exemption from doubt of certain propositions to our
practical interests, the dependence of that exemption on the fact that, at any given time,
we are trying to get things done. And another of Wittgenstein’s (1969: §§ 94-8) metaphors,
contrasting the river  bed with the flux of  the river itself,  takes this  line of  thought
further. Wittgenstein (1969: §§ 94, 105) thinks of our picture of the world (to which the
set of our hinge commitments is clearly integral) as the background to all our doubts,
beliefs and inquiries: not itself a true or false proposition but the background against
which true and false are distinguished; not itself an argument but the “element in which
arguments  have their  life.”  This  certain,  indubitable  background is  compared to  the
bedrock of a river, the river itself being the flux of our dubitable beliefs, constantly open
to question in the light of our hinge commitments. But, in metaphorical terms, parts of
the bedrock may break off and become part of the flux of the river, while parts of the
river  itself  may harden and become bedrock.  The same shifting  relationship obtains
between our ordinary beliefs and the hinge commitments which form the background
against which those beliefs make sense; although there must be a distinction, at any given
time, between what is open to doubt and what is beyond doubt, that distinction is not,
and cannot be a sharp or permanent one. The course of our experience, and our ‘ways of
acting’ in relation to it, may cause us to re-evaluate things and to doubt what was once
part of the indubitable background or it may lead us to take for granted something that
was previously open to question. To my mind, the river metaphor carries the important
implication that what counts as a hinge proposition at one time, in one context, may not
count as a hinge proposition in a different context. The river metaphor seems to indicate
not only that, for Wittgenstein, the fact that we exempt certain propositions from doubt
is dependent on the fact that we have practical interests but also that the set of specific
propositions that are exempted from doubt at any given time is relative to the specific
practical interests we have at that time. To take an illustration from Wittgenstein (1969:
§ 421) mentioned by Goodman (2002: 24), the proposition that I am in England could be
‘on the route of inquiry’ at one time, for example, if I am lost near the border between
England and Scotland. At another time, however, it might express a hinge commitment
which I take for granted when, for instance, I doubt whether next Monday is a national
holiday. The shifting nature of what counts as a hinge commitment constitutes evidence
for the relativity of hinge commitments, and therefore of the certainty with which we are
necessarily committed to them, to our practical concerns. This relativity is connected, I
think, with the Wittgensteinian rejection of the idea that hinge propositions, and the
certainty with which we are committed to them, have to do with belief and knowledge.
11 It  is  in  this  sense,  I  suggest,  that  the  Wittgensteinian  conception  of  certainty  may
reasonably be described as a ‘pragmatist’ one. It embodies what Cornel West (1989: 89 et
passim) has referred to as the specifically pragmatist hallmark of ‘anti-epistemology’ or
the ‘evasion’ of philosophy centred around epistemology, as traditionally understood. In
the next part of this paper, I want further to defend this view by considering the affinity
between the Wittgensteinian conception of certainty just set out and the one in play in
the  work  of  the  neglected  thinker,  broadly  included among the  pragmatists,  George
Santayana.
⁂
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12 Santayana develops his concept of ‘animal faith,’ which I want to read as a pragmatist
concept of certainty, as a direct response to the Cartesian problem of scepticism. He
criticises the Cartesian quest for knowledge based upon foundations of absolute certainty,
5 arguing that there can be no such foundations and therefore, on this conception, no
knowledge. Santayana offers his concept of animal faith as a more satisfactory idea on
which to base an account of knowledge.
13 Santayana’s (1923: 14ff., cf. Sprigge 1995: 34-5) argument is that solipsism is a no less
coherent response to Cartesian-style scepticism than the more popular insistence on the
existence of  the external  world.  And he argues  that,  to  be  consistent,  the sceptic  is
compelled to subscribe to an even more radical solipsism, what he calls ‘solipsism of the
present  moment.’  That  experience  exists  is  indubitable  for  the  sceptic,  as  Descartes
recognised, but a sense of identity and of a temporal order of experiences is only possible
if  it  is  assumed  that  the  experiences  are  those  of  a  being  not  simply  composed  of
experiences. But this is one of the very points in question and the sceptic has no grounds
for the assumption. As Santayana (1923: 28-9) explains, the solipsist might experience
qualities  which  those  committed  to  the  existence  of  the  external  world  would  call
‘pastness’ or ‘futurity’ but without having any commitment to the existence of a real
succession of events. Whether or not it is actually possible to live in this kind of state, it is
the only theoretical position which involves no element of faith or belief that is not either
itself certain or founded upon a certainty construed as a form of knowledge. Timothy
Sprigge (1995:  38ff.)  takes  up Santayana’s  argument for  the view that,  if  we confine
ourselves to the goal of certainty in the knowledge sense, we will  have no reason to
believe in change since the experience of apparent change is perfectly compatible with
fundamental doubt about the existence of real change. Someone might object that the
solipsist accepts the existence of an experiential flux and that this flux just consists in
experiences really giving way to one another, therefore even the solipsist should
conclude that change really occurs: the flux of experience just consists in things which
are in real, and not just specious, temporal relations to one another. But, in defence of
Santayana,  Sprigge  (1995:  37)  counters  this  objection  by  asking  us  to  think  of  the
experience of a swinging pendulum – which is the single experience of the pendulum in
action. For real change to be experienced, this experience would have to give way to
another experience. But this kind of change cannot be experienced in the same sense as
the experience of the pendulum, which could be specious. Whereas it is possible to have
an experience of the swinging pendulum without believing in the existence of anything
other than that experience, it is not similarly possible to experience real change without
being committed to some larger context, other than experience, within which the change
occurs  from one  experience  to  another.  In  the  experience  of  real  change,  a  second
experience would take over the story told by the first. And if this really happens they
cannot just be aspects of a larger experiential content, existing only in the present, as the
solipsist of the present moment would be forced to suggest. In other words, the solipsist
of the present moment could not possibly believe in real change and is not compelled to
believe  in  anything external  to  experience itself  as  it  appears  to  her  in  the present
moment.
14 So on the conception of knowledge aimed at by the Cartesian practitioners of the quest
for  certainty  in  the  knowledge  sense,  there  can  be  none.  But,  as  Sprigge  (1995:  47)
summarises, “On the whole Santayana’s explorations of scepticism are designed to show
the hopelessness of a certain ideal of knowledge, that for which knowledge must be based
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on  indubitable  foundations,  not  to  show  the  impossibility  of  knowledge  on  a  more
sensible interpretation of the term.” That more sensible interpretation is referred to by
Santayana as ‘animal faith’: human beings are compared to animals who have to cope
with  a  difficult  environment,  their  survival  depending  on  a  kind  of  implicit
responsiveness to that environment of which belief in that environment’s existence is not
much more than a self-conscious expression (Sprigge 1995: 48). There may be no rational
grounds for this belief but it is psychologically irresistible and practically indispensable.
The phenomenon of shock is Santayana’s (1923: 139ff.) specific example which he refers to
as “the great argument for existence of  material  things” which “establishes realism”
(Santayana 1923: 145, 142). He responds to the solipsist, understood as the connoisseur of
the character of experience, in the following way: “But when a clap of thunder deafens
me, or a flash of lightning at once dazzles and blinds me, the fact that something has
happened is far more obvious to me than what it is that has just occurred” (Santayana
1923: 140). 
15 The commitment to the existence of the external world, as Santayana describes it here, as
a  prime  example  of  animal  faith,  is  functioning  in  precisely  the  same  way  as  a
Wittgensteinian hinge commitment. It is an indubitable, ‘animal’ commitment, not itself
subject to inquiry, which is taken for granted when anything is believed or doubted: the
belief that the noise was a clap of thunder, for instance. In harmony with Pritchard’s
reading of Wittgenstein, it is taken to be rationally groundless. This commitment is what,
for Santayana, forms the background to our ordinary everyday beliefs and doubts;  in
Wittgenstein’s  terminology,  it  is  embodied  in  the  groundless  ‘way  of  acting’  which
rationally  grounds  those  beliefs.  That  this  is  so  can  be  seen  by  one  of  Santayana’s
descriptions of animal faith as it is operative in everyday life, the way it functions in
relation to the bread I am eating:
The bread, for animal faith, is this thing I am eating, and causing it to disappear to
my substantial advantage […]; […] bread is this substance I can eat and turn into my
own substance;  in seizing and biting it  I  determine its  identity and its  place in
nature, and in transforming it I prove its existence. (Santayana 1923: 83)
16 As Sprigge (1995: 63) summarises Santayana’s general epistemology, it consists in “the
recommendation to develop our view of the world on the basis, not of some supposed
elementary data of consciousness, but of everyday beliefs which it is dishonest to pretend
we do not hold.” And it is this kind of epistemology, which Cornel West refers to as an
anti-epistemology or an evasion of epistemology traditionally construed, that was further
developed by the classical pragmatists like James and Dewey and their neo-pragmatist
successors.  West  says  of  Dewey  that  he  wilfully  commits  ‘intellectual  regicide’:  “he
wanted,”  West  writes,  “to  behead  modern  philosophy  by  dethroning  epistemology”
(West 1989: 89). Pragmatism can be understood as being motivated by a desire to evade
epistemology as it has evolved under Descartes’s shadow, inseparable from the quest for
certainty  in  the  knowledge  sense.  For  Santayana,  the  scepticism  which  Descartes
strategically embraced – in order eventually to replace it with certainty in the knowledge
sense – is irrefutable and leads us into a hopeless solipsism of the present moment in
which  it  is  very  likely  impossible  to  live.  And  if  we  take  certainty  as  our  ideal  of
knowledge, we will soon find that there can be none: a consistent theoretical position,
perhaps, but practically pointless and inconsistent with our everyday assumptions. So the
pragmatist focus on, and understanding of,  lived experience involves a very different
concept  of  certainty  and  builds  in the  interaction  between  self  and  world  which  is
questioned by the radical sceptic (Goodman 2002: 23). Experience does not yield the kind
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of  certain  knowledge  which  Descartes  sought  but  rather  commitments  that,  while
rationally  groundless,  are  practically  indubitable  and  indispensable  to  us.  And  our
commitment to propositions of  this  kind,  which Santayana saw as  the self-conscious
expressions of ‘animal faith’ is ineluctably dubitable and uncertain if certainty is taken to
be a kind of rationally supported belief or knowledge. To carry on the metaphor of faith:
these commitments are like the tenets of a religion as it is lived and practiced, with all the
attendant doubts, rather than as formalised in dry definitions and dogmas designed to
exclude ambiguity and uncertainty.
17 I suggest, with Wittgenstein and Santayana, that the sense in which we take such non-
optional, yet rationally groundless commitments as certainties can have nothing to do
with  certainty  in  the  knowledge  sense.  I  have  been  arguing,  on  the  contrary,  that
reflection on the nature of these commitments points to what I call a ‘pragmatist’ concept
of certainty, found to be operative in the work of both Wittgenstein and Santayana. For
both thinkers, propositions which express certainty do not express beliefs or knowledge
but rather express the arational, ‘animal’ commitments which, as Pritchard (2012) shows,
nonetheless ground all (essentially local) rational justification, functioning as the ‘hinges’
relative to which we test and evaluate other propositions and which are presupposed by
these epistemic practices of testing and evaluation.
⁂
18 In this section I discuss a point of apparent contrast between the lines of thought on
certainty identified in the works of  Wittgenstein and Santayana:  namely,  the way in
which their views on this topic respond to the sceptical problem. 
19 Santayana’s  account  of  animal  faith  which,  I  have  argued,  involves  a  pragmatist
conception of certainty is presented as a direct response to the problem of scepticism. In
the  preface  to  Scepticism  and  Animal  Faith,  Santayana  (1923:  vi)  states,  “I  stand  in
philosophy  exactly  where  I  stand  in  daily  life  […]  and  admit  the  same  encircling
ignorance.” As regards the first principles, the discovery of which motivated Descartes,
he says, “[t]hey can never be discovered, if discovered at all, until they have been taken
for granted,  and employed in the very investigation which reveals them” (Santayana
1923:  2).  His  account  of  animal  faith,  with  its  pragmatist  conception of  certainty,  is
offered,  then,  as  the  more  congenial  alternative  to  an  irrefutable  scepticism  whose
consequences  are  practically  intolerable.  Wittgenstein  (1969:  §§ 359,  475),  in  an
apparently similar move, criticises the thought that reasons come to an end with special,
foundational reasons and suggests instead that “when we reach bedrock we discover only
a rationally groundless ‘animal’ commitment […], a kind of ‘primitive’ trust” (Pritchard
2012: 259). Are Wittgenstein and Santayana offering the same kind of response to the
problem of scepticism?
20 In  my  view,  there  are  reasons  to  think  that  they  are  not.  Santayana’s  response  to
scepticism is not a reductio ad absurdum.  He does not attempt to show, or succeed in
showing, that scepticism is incoherent or entails something incoherent. He admits that it
entails  a  position  (solipsism of  the  present  moment)  that  is  so  far  from being  self-
contradictory that “it might, under other circumstances, be the normal and invincible
attitude of the spirit” (Santayana 1923: 17). The difficulty he finds in maintaining such a
position is the fact that it is signally unsuited to the “social and laborious character of
human life” as a opposed, for example, to the life of a “creature whose whole existence
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was passed under a hard shell” which “might find nothing paradoxical or acrobatic in
solipsism” and “might have a clearer mind”; such a creature “would not be troubled by
doubts, because he would believe nothing” (Santayana 1923: 17). Santayana’s response to
scepticism, then, is an appeal to the impracticality of the position it entails. His response
to scepticism is to accept the possibility of its truth while refusing to accept its truth on
account of the unwelcome and impractical implications. The implications would perhaps
not be so unwelcome for a creature under a shell who would doubt nothing because he
believed nothing. But we human beings would be compelled to doubt everything that we
believed and, on account of the ‘social and laborious’ character of our lives, could not live
in such a state.  It  is  partly for this reason that he professes to “stand in philosophy
exactly where I stand in daily life”: he views the local project of doubting everyday beliefs
as analogous to the global sceptical project of doubting everything. For Santayana the
sceptical  project  of  applying  doubt  universally,  although  impractical,  is  perfectly
coherent. 
21 Wittgenstein, by contrast, wants to distinguish the sceptical practice of universal doubt
from ordinary epistemic practices, including doubting. In Pritchard’s (2011a: 524) view,
Wittgenstein’s implicit claim is that “the philosophical picture that the sceptic uses is
completely  divorced from the non-philosophical  picture that  we ordinarily employ.” In
ordinary life, our claims to know are connected with the practice of resolving doubts. For
a doubt to be resolved, as mentioned earlier, the reason in support of the relevant belief
has to be more certain than the belief itself in order to play the required supporting role.
This Wittgensteinian picture of the structure of reasons operative in everyday life also
applies to doubt:
a reason needs to be offered to motivate the doubt and, crucially, such a reason
must be more certain that what is doubted since otherwise one would have more
reason to doubt the reason for doubt that to doubt what is doubted.  (Pritchard
2011: 527)
22 As Pritchard points out, this is the point of Wittgenstein’s (1969: § 553) claim that if, in
the absence of a reason to doubt it, I need to check by looking whether I have two hands, I
might as well doubt my eyesight as well. In other words, doubt, operative in our everyday
epistemic practices, requires grounds that are more certain than the doubt itself, namely,
hinge commitments which are “in deed not doubted.” The sceptical project, on the other
hand, denies such certainties: it demands that we doubt even what is most certain. But, if
as Wittgestein thinks “there are hinges on which any epistemic evaluation must turn,”
this  is  an  incoherent  idea  (Pritchard  2011:  530).6 A  doubt  applied  universally,  not
constrained in the way that our ordinary epistemic practices are constrained, could have
no supporting grounds, would be of no practical significance and, in Wittgenstein’s (1969:
§ 450) words, “would not be a doubt.”
23 So unlike Santayana, Wittgenstein does not accept the coherence or legitimacy of the
sceptical problem on account of the illegitimacy of its isolation and abstraction of the
practice of doubting from its ordinary epistemic context, a context in which certainty,
conceived in a pragmatist way, is operative in the form of hinge commitments. He accepts
something of the spirit of scepticism in that hinge propositions, and the kind of certainty
with which we are committed to them, point to ‘the groundlessness of our believing.’ But
it is the very existence and necessity of hinge commitments that prevents Wittgenstein
from accepting the sceptical idea that doubt can legitimately be applied universally and
without restriction, even to what we take to be most certain. It is perhaps significant that,
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in the very paragraph where Wittgenstein (1969: § 359) echoes Santayana’s epithet and
describes certainty as ‘something animal,’ he goes on to explain it, in contrast to him, as
“something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified.” Whereas Santayana shares
Wittgenstein’s pragmatist conception of certainty, this is because, like the sceptic,  he
regards our certainties to be unjustifiable rather than moving beyond the distinction
between being justified or unjustified as Wittgenstein attempts to do.
24 So although Wittgenstein and Santayana share a pragmatist conception of certainty, this
concept constitutes a very different kind of response, for each thinker, to the problem of
scepticism. For Santayana, it is a way of avoiding a very real and threatening problem; for
Wittgenstein it is a means of exposing it as a pseudo-problem. Santayana’s response to
scepticism is a pragmatic one whereas Wittgenstein’s is a logical one. I explore, in the
concluding section, the broader implications of this difference between Wittgenstein’s
and Santayana’s use of the pragmatist conception of certainty as a response to scepticism.
⁂
25 It might be thought, firstly, that Wittgenstein’s logical response pre-empts Santayana’s
pragmatic one and that Wittgenstein’s use of the pragmatist conception of certainty to
expose the problem of scepticism as a pseudo-problem closes off the route to pragmatism,
as further developed by philosophers like James and Dewey. This thought is expressed in
Bertrand Russell’s statement that the “scepticism embodied in Pragmatism is that which
says  ‘since  all  beliefs  are  absurd,  we may as  well  believe  what  is  most  convenient’”
(Russell 1910: 98). Wittgenstein’s logical response to scepticism denies the premise that
all  beliefs  are  absurd;  his  argument,  as  we  have  seen,  is  that  it  is  in  the  nature  of
rationally grounded beliefs that they turn on ‘hinges’ for which it makes no sense to
demand further rational justification. 
26 Apart from the fact that Russell’s second phrase (‘we may as well believe what is most
convenient’)  is  a  crude  caricature  of  the  pragmatist  position,7 the  main  import  of
pragmatism  (its  focus  on  lived  experience,  on  the  practical  context  in  which
apprehension  occurs  and  on  the  consequences  of  beliefs  for  specific  problematic
situations) is perfectly compatible with the Wittgensteinian picture (Dewey 1952: 571-2).
If scepticism is indeed a pseudo-problem, it seems perfectly reasonable to focus, as the
pragmatists  do,  on  the  consequences  of  beliefs  rather  than  on  their foundations  or
hinges.  As  Wittgenstein  pointed  out,  moreover,  these  hinges  are  rarely explicitly
formulated or questioned in real life – they are “in deed not doubted.” Pragmatists like
Dewey are concerned with human practices of inquiry (logic included) insofar as they
ramify in this practical demesne of lived experience; as Dewey puts it, pragmatists are
concerned with truth and falsity as having existential application, and as something
determined by means of inquiry into material existence. For in the latter case the
question of truth or falsity is the very thing to be determined. (Dewey 1952: 573)
27 If Dewey’s pragmatic emphasis is preferred, the Wittgensteinian response to scepticism
will count as a welcome further warrant for the pragmatist focus on lived experience,
albeit one provided by a thinker who did not claim to be a pragmatist but to be merely
“trying  to  say  something  that  sounds  like  pragmatism.”  If,  on  the  other  hand,
Wittgenstein’s logical emphasis is preferred, the only route to pragmatism that is closed
off will be the one mapped out by Santayana: one whose point of departure is acceptance
of the irrefutability, and potential truth, of scepticism, an admission which presupposes
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the  coherence  of  the  sceptical  problem.  Indeed,  Wittgenstein’s  argument  might  give
someone with a logical turn of mind a much better reason than Santayana provides to
avoid scepticism and instead to make the move into pragmatism. If we are not content, in
Jamesian style, to allow temperament to decide the philosophical issue, we shall have to
look for other grounds on which to base our decision whether, given our reflections on
certainty, to view pragmatism as a live philosophical option. My own view, to repeat, is
that  both  the  logical  and  the  pragmatic  perspectives  potentially  leave  the  route  to
pragmatism open. Since Wittgenstein’s argument can be used to justify in logical terms
the taking of a pragmatist route (given an appropriate attitude to scepticism as a pseudo-
problem, an illusory threat illegitimately abstracted from ordinary epistemic practices),
and since the pragmatist perspective cannot endorse a purely logical point of view with
no necessary existential application, my own view is that such a pragmatist route is the
one that should be taken in preference to the narrow kind of logical  route taken by
Russell. It is, I suspect, one that most of us, in our less explicitly philosophical moments,
will find that we have already taken.
28 So the first implication of the difference between Wittgenstein and Santayana on the
issue of scepticism is that the move into pragmatism can be supported by the recognition
of the compatibility of an appropriate version of pragmatism with the Wittgensteinian
picture.  To  take  this  point  further,  secondly,  this  move  has  humanist  implications,
apparently  recognised by both philosophers.  Despite their  difference on the issue of
scepticism, both Wittgenstein and Santayana preserve what Cavell (1979: 241) has called
the ‘moral’ of scepticism.8 Both agree, though for different reasons, that our beliefs are
ultimately  groundless,  that  they  are  not  based  upon foundations  of  what  we  would
ordinarily call ‘knowledge,’ still less ‘certainty’ in the knowledge sense. This recognition
of the ultimate groundlessness of our beliefs is developed by the classical pragmatists in
the  form  of  humanism.  William  James  (1907:  242)  endorses  F. C. S. Schiller’s
understanding of  ‘humanism’  as  “the doctrine that  to  an unascertainable  extent  our
truths are man-made products,” the humanistic principle being succinctly expressed as
follows: “you can’t weed out the human contribution” (James 1907: 254). It is our concrete
human concerns that determine the kind of attention we pay to things. And the kind of
attention we pay to things determines what we find – it determines what stands out as
salient to us, what seems worth mentioning, and what fades into the background – and
this  will  not  necessarily  be the same in every context  because,  in each context,  our
practical concerns may be different. In Wittgenstein’s language, our practical interests
determine what is the bedrock and what is the river. James (1907: 251) illustrates with a
relatively  simple  example:  “You can take a  chess-board as  black squares  on a  white
ground, or as white squares on a black ground, and neither conception is a false one.” It is
clear that, for James (1907: 253), all perception is interpretation, all seeing is ‘seeing-as’;
which, if any, of our perceptions may be treated as the more true, he thinks, “depends all
together on the human use of it.” To be a humanist, for James (1907: 247), is to recognise
that “We receive […] the block of marble, but we carve the statue ourselves.” Since, in his
phrase, “[m]an engenders truths upon [reality]” (James 1907: 257, 260), it follows that
although the finite experiences which make up our human world are dependent upon
each other, ‘lean’ on each other, as it were, the whole of human experience, if it makes
sense  to  speak of  such a  whole,  itself  “leans  on nothing”;  when it  comes to  human
experience as a whole, James (1907: 260) writes: “Nothing outside of the flux secures the
issue of it.”
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29 In conclusion, then, it is clear that this pragmatist form of humanism (which correlates
with existential forms championed by certain European philosophers of the twentieth
century) is bolstered by Wittgenstein’s argument for the groundlessness of our believing.
Thus humanism, according to which it makes no sense to speak of the world apart from
the  various  modes  of  human  engagement  with  it,  is  a  major  consequence  of  the
pragmatist conception of certainty which, I have argued, is shared by Wittgenstein and
Santayana.  That  conception  preserves,  in  an  illuminating  way,  Cavell’s  ‘moral’  of
scepticism: the realisation that our beliefs  are ultimately groundless.  And that moral
finds  most  direct  expression  in  the  humanism  involved  in  the  Jamesean  version  of
pragmatism just mentioned. What that pragmatist form of humanism reflects, I think, is
what  West  calls  ‘anti-epistemology’  or  the  ‘evasion’  of  philosophy, epistemologically
construed.  The  implication  is  not  that  we  are  unable  to  provide  legitimate  rational
justification for our beliefs but that a philosophical search for rational justification of
those beliefs as a whole, a whole which ‘leans on nothing,’ will inevitably be frustrated.
Wittgenstein’s arguments, and Pritchard’s readings, articulate very clearly just why this
is so. They provide good arguments for adopting the humanistic evasion of epistemology
which is a hallmark of existential phenomenology as well as pragmatism. And this evasive
kind of  philosophy begins  with  Cavell’s  (1980:  145)  observation,  made  in  relation to
Emerson’s thought, that our relationship to the world’s existence is “closer than the ideas
of  believing and knowing are made to convey.” If  Wittgenstein is  right  about the a-
rationality of certainty, the great value of the philosophies of existential phenomenology
and pragmatism lies in their joint recognition that the main task of philosophy is to
articulate the nature, and the various modes, of that intimate relationship.
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NOTES
1. I call it a ‘Wittgensteinian’ concept, mindful of the limitations, recognised by Pritchard 2011, of
the extent to which arguments extracted from On Certainty can confidently be attributed to
Wittgenstein. As Pritchard reminds us, the material in this book was not prepared or sanctioned
for publication by Wittgenstein himself.
2. A ‘hinge commitment’ is just a commitment to a hinge proposition.
3. Wittgenstein (1969: § 317).
4. Italics mine.
5. I shall refer to this ultimate aim of the Cartesian project as ‘certainty in the knowledge sense.’
6. Italics mine.
7. Russell 1910, cf. Dewey 1952.
8. I  owe this reference to Cavell  to a remark made by Duncan Pritchard at a meeting of the
Edinburgh Epistemology Research Group in April 2012.
ABSTRACTS
The  ways in  which  Wittgenstein  was  directly  influenced  by  William  James  (by  his  early
psychological work as well his later philosophy) have been thoroughly explored and charted by
Russell B. Goodman. In particular, Goodman has drawn attention to the pragmatist resonances of
the  Wittgensteinian  notion  of  hinge  propositions  as  developed  and  articulated  in  the
posthumously edited and published work, On Certainty. This paper attempts to extend Goodman’s
observation,  moving  beyond  his  focus  on  James  (specifically,  James’s  Pragmatism)  as  his
pragmatist reference point. It aims to articulate the affinity between Wittgenstein’s thought on
the topic of certainty and that of the neglected pragmatist thinker, George Santayana.
The paper draws on Duncan Pritchard’s recent reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty in order to
articulate the concept of certainty involved in the notion of hinge propositions. It identifies two
important  and  related  points  of  affinity  between  this  Wittgensteinian  line  of  thought  on
certainty and the line of thought on the same topic articulated in Santayana’s Scepticism and
Animal Faith. The paper argues, firstly, that, both lines of thought reflect a pragmatist concept of
certainty,  according to  which our  most  fundamental  certainties  are  not  conceived as  purely
theoretical objects of belief or knowledge but rather as the arational presuppositions of beliefs
and practical action. Secondly, it examines the way in which the pragmatist concept of certainty
functions,  for  the two thinkers  as  a  response to scepticism.  It  argues that  although the two
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thinkers’ responses are very different, they are mutually compatible and, together, point towards
the  possibility  of  a  distinctively  pragmatist  response  to  scepticism  which  involves  an  anti-
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